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THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE RECONSIDERED:
A RETURN TO ACCOUNTABILITY IN TORT LAW?
ROBERT M. ACKERMAN*

I. INTRODUCTION

The recent enactment of mandatory seat belt laws in several states' has
sparked new debate regarding the seat belt defense in personal injury
actions involving automobile collisions. Long scorned by many courts
due to the lack of widespread seat belt use, the seat belt defense may
acquire new life as legislatures consider statutes requiring the use of seat
*Professor of Law, The Dickinson School of Law. B.A. 1973, Colgate University; J.D. 1976,
Harvard Law School.
The author would like to thank his research assistant, Stephen J. Cipolla, for his valuable research
and constructive criticism.
1. As of October, 1985 mandatory seat belt laws had been enacted in fifteen states:
New York: Act of July 12, 1984, chs. 365-66, 1984 N.Y. Consol. Advance Laws
Serv. 720-22 (codified at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229-c (McKinney 1985)).
New Jersey: Passenger Automobile Seat Belt Usage Act, ch. 179, 1984 N.J. Sess.
L. Serv. 13 (West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:3-76.2e to 39:3-76.2k (West
1985)).
Illinois: Act of Jan. 8, 1985, No. 83-1507 (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95'/2,
§ 12-603.1 (1985)).
Nebraska: Act of Jan. 21, 1985, L.B. 496, (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§§39-669.26 and 39-6, 171 (1985)).
Missouri: Act of Mar. 5, 1985, L.R. 172-00, 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. I (Vernon).
Michigan: Act of Mar. 8, 1985, No. 85-1, 1985 Mich. Legis. Serv. I (West) (to
be codified at MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.710e-257.710f (West)).
New Mexico: Safety Belt Use Act, 1985 N.M. Laws 131 (April 2, 1985) (to be

codified at N.M.

STAT. ANN.

§§ 66-7-370-66-7-373).

Indiana: Act of April 17, 1985, No. 1957 (to be codified at IND. CODE §§9-814-1-9-8-14-6).

Hawaii: Act of April 19, 1985, H.B. 89 (to be codified at

HAWAII REV. STAT.

§ 291).
Texas: Act of May 16, 1985, 1985 Tex. Sess. Law Serv. 6062 (Vernon) (to be
codified at TEx. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, §§ 107C and 139E, and art. 6687b, § 22).
Oklahoma: Act of May 22, 1985, 1985 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 340 (West) (to be
codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 12-416-12-420).
North Carolina: Act of May 23, 1985, ch. 222, 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 76 (to be
codified at N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-135.2A).
Connecticut: Act of May 23, 1985, 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 435 (West) (to be
codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-100a).
Louisiana: Act of July 10, 1985, No. 377 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv. 327 (West)
(to be codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1(96) and (97) and 295. 1).
California: Act of October 1, 1985, A.B. 27 (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE,
§ 12810.2 and 27315).
Mandatory seat belt laws are under consideration in several other states. Consideration has been
prompted, at least in part, by a U.S. Department of Transportation (DOT) rule requiring installation
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belts, 2 with criminal sanctions for nonuse. It is, therefore, an appropriate
time to evaluate the potential effect of such statutory enactments and to
consider the application of the seat belt defense in various contexts.
This article, after presenting a brief history of the seat belt defense,
will address the viability of the defense in light of recent statutory enactments. We will see how many such enactments actually serve to thwart,
rather than promote, the defense. We will then discuss the application of
the defense in terms of the damages recoverable by plaintiffs in auto
collision cases. The defense will then be considered in the context of
products liability actions, with particular emphasis on economic implications. The article will conclude with some comments on the relationship
of the defense to notions of autonomy and accountability. This discussion
will suggest that the seat belt defense has important implications in terms
of both economic efficiency and individual accountability.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE
The seat belt defense precludes an automobile accident victim from
recovering for injuries which would have been prevented had he/she worn
a seat belt. To date, the defense has gained limited acceptance. While
some jurisdictions have accepted the defense, 3 the more prevalent judicial
reaction to date has been to reject it. Some courts have rejected the defense
because of difficulty in categorizing it. 4 These courts have reasoned that
the seat belt defense does not fall under the rule of avoidable consequences, because the rule deals only with post-accident conduct.' Ironof passive restraints (i.e., air bags) in all new cars beginning with model year 1990 unless, prior to
that time, mandatory belt usage laws that cover at least two-thirds of the U.S. population are enacted.
49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984) [hereinafter DOT rule]. Whether the laws now being enacted are of the
type contemplated under the DOT rule is beyond the scope of this article.
The Commonwealth of Puerto Rico has had a mandatory seat belt use law since 1974, well before
issuance of the DOT rule. P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 9, § 1212 (1975).
Nevada has also enacted a mandatory seat belt use law. Act of June 14, 1985, 1985 NEV. STAT.
678. However, the Nevada statute's proviso that it will be effective only upon repeal of the nationwide
55 mile-per-hour speed limit renders it of little or no practical value.
2. For purposes of this article, the term "seat belt" includes both lap belts available in older
models and in rear seats of most newer models and combination lap belt/shoulder harness systems
currently available in passenger vehicles.
3. See, e.g., Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969); Spier v. Barker,
35 N.Y.2d 444, 323 N.E.2d 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d 916, (1974); Sams v. Sams, 247 S.C. 467, 148
S.E.2d 154 (1966); Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 149 N.W.2d 626 (1967).
4. See, e.g., Lipscomb v. Diamiani, 226 A.2d 914 (Del. 1967); Hansen v. Howard 0. Miller,
Inc., 93 Idaho 314, 460 P.2d 739 (1969); Miller v. Haynes, 454 S.W.2d 293 (Mo. App. 1970);
Miller v. Miller, 273 N.C. 228, 160 S.E.2d 65 (1968); Barry v. Coca-Cola Co., 99 N.J. Super.
270, 239 A.2d 273 (1967); Derheim v. N. Fiorito Co., 80 Wash. 2d 161, 492 P.2d 1030 (1972).
5. E.g., Selgado v. Commercial Warehouse Co., 88 N.M. 579, 544 P.2d 719 (Ct. App. 1975).
The New Mexico Court of Appeals later reversed itself on this issue, stating that "the distinction
between pre-accident and post-accident [conduct] is artificial," and that "the better approach is
formed in the 'apportionment of damages' rule" of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 comment
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ically, many of the same courts have stated that the seat belt defense is
not an example of contributory negligence, because contributory negligence must play a role in causing the accident. 6 Apart from this reasoning's formalistic adherence to legal pigeonholes, it is clear that the failure
to fasten one's seat belt does, in fact, play a role in causing the accident,
or, more importantly, the injury ultimately sustained.' It is hornbook law
that the final element of a cause of action in negligence is injury, toward
which the other elements (duty of care, breach of duty, causation) must
be directed.8 An automobile accident, and the injuries related thereto,
should not be viewed as including merely the initial collision, but also
as encompassing the events immediately subsequent thereto. The accident
does not end until after the vehicle has stopped tumbling down the ravine
or the occupants have come to rest against a utility pole after having been
propelled through the windshield. Obviously, the failure to fasten the seat
belt has played a role in many (if not most) post-collision injuries sustained
c (1985). Thomas v. Henson, 102 N.M. 417, 423, 696 P.2d 1010, 1016 (Ct. App. 1984), rev'd 102
N.M. 326, 695 P.2d 476 (1985). In reversing the Court of Appeals, the New Mexico Supreme Court
acknowledged that the lower court opinion was "well-reasoned, carefully thought out, and logical
in its conclusion," but stated that "the creation of a 'seat belt defense' is a matter for the Legislature,
not for the judiciary." Id. at 327, 695 P.2d at 477.
6. Indeed, even courts accepting the seat belt defense have been reluctant to call it contributory
negligence, preferring the terms "avoidable consequences" or "mitigation of damages." See, e.g.,
Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 451-52, 323 N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 921-22; Mount v. McClellan, 91
I11.App. 2d 1, 5, 234 N.E.2d 329, 331 (1968). Nomenclature aside, however, the defense is most
logically applied in a manner similar to that used for contributory or comparative negligence. This
is particularly true in comparative negligence jurisdiction. See infra text accompanying notes 6681.
7. Prosser (and his revisers) apparently accept this view. Suggesting that "the doctrines of contributory negligence and avoidable consequences are in reality the same," Keeton's revision of
Prosser states:
In a limited number of situations, the plaintiff's unreasonable conduct, although
it is prior or contemporaneous, may be found to have caused only a separable part
of the damage. In such a case, even though it is called contributory negligence, the
apportionment will be made. . . . A more difficult problem is presented when the
plaintiff's prior conduct is found to have played no part in bringing about an impact
or accident, but to have aggravated the ensuing damages. In such a case, upon a
finding that the plaintiff's excessive speed in driving was not responsible for a
collision, but greatly increased the damages resulting from it, the Connecticut court
refused to make any division, and held that the plaintiff could recover the entire
amount. In analogous situations, however, other courts have apportioned the damages, holding that the plaintiff's recovery should be reduced to the extent that they
have been aggravated by his own antecedent negligence. This may be the better
view, unless we are to place an artificial emphasis upon the moment of impact, and
the pure mechanics of causation. ...
W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 459 (5th ed. 1984); see also W. PROSSER, LAW OF
TORTS, 423-24 (4th ed. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 465 comment c (1965), calling

for apportionment of damages "where the antecedent negligence of the plaintiff is found not to
contribute in any way to the original accident or injury, but to be a substantial contributing factor
in increasing the harm which ensues."
8. W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 164-65 (5th ed. 1984).
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by occupants of motor vehicles. The occupant's failure to fasten the seat
belt may be seen as being a cause (although clearly not the only cause)
of that chain of events that may be described as the "accident," leading
to injury.9
Some courts have refused to accept the seat belt defense because the
plaintiff is under no duty to anticipate the negligence of another.'° This
view is at odds with the usual view of proximate cause, in which the
intervening negligent acts of third parties are usually deemed foreseeable.'" Many courts have rejected the defense due to the absence of any
2
statutory duty to buckle one's seat belt.' Of course, while a duty of care
3 it may also arise as a matter of common
may be imposed by statute,
law in the absence of any statutory standard. '" In any event, the enactment
9. Second collision cases, in which courts have imposed liability on auto manufacturers for failure
to design crashworthy vehicles, are consistent with the premise that our inquiry may extend beyond
the initial collision. E.g., Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391 F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968); McMullen
v. Volkswagen of America, 274 Or. 83, 545 P.2d 117 (1976). Like the seat belt defense, these cases
involve pre-accident conduct which increases the likelihood of post-collision injury. (For further
discussion of second collision cases, see infra note 11 and text accompanying note 116.)
10. See, e.g., Britton v. Doehring, 286 Ala. 498, 508, 242 So.2d 666, 675 (1970); Schmitzer
v. Misener-Bennett Ford, Inc., 135 Mich. App. 350, 359, 354 N.W.2d 336, 340 (1984); Amend V.
Bell, 89 Wash. 2d 124, 570 P.2d 138, 143 (1977).
11. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Rockford, 35 11. App.2d 107, 182 N.E.2d 240 (1962); Kline
v. Moyer, 325 Pa. 357, 191 A.43 (1937); Houston v. Strickland, 184 Va. 994, 37 S.E.2d 64 (1946).
One commentator has noted an ironic twist in the arguments of plaintiffs' counsel regarding the
foreseeability of highway accidents:
It is interesting to note, however, the inconsistent positions adopted by plaintiffs'
personal injury counsel, depending on the identity of the defendant. Where an
injured plaintiff sues an automobile manufacturer for injuries sustained in a "second collision," i.e., the impact with allegedly defective or unnecessarily sharp
components in an automobile interior, plaintiffs' counsel have argued that collisions are a frequent and inevitable contingency of normal automobile use; thus,
the argument continues, the manufacturer is under a duty to anticipate such
collisions and to design the vehicle accordingly so as to prevent an unreasonable
risk of injury. The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals has accepted such an argument
and, in one of the leading automobile design defect cases, has held the manufacturer to a duty to anticipate collisions. Larsen v. General Motors Corp., 391
F.2d 495 (8th Cir. 1968). On the other hand, where a plaintiff sues an individual
defendant for injuries sustained in an ordinary automobile accident and the defendant argues that plaintiff had a duty to anticipate a collision and therefore
should have been wearing a seat belt, plaintiff's counsel will argue that to impose
such a duty would require him to anticipate another's negligence; consequently,
plaintiff should not be held to a duty to fasten a seat belt and thus take reasonable
precautions for his own safety. [Citation omitted.]
Fuchs, Reallocating the Risk of Loss in Automobile Accidents by Means of Mandatory Seat Belt Use
Legislation, 52 So. CAL. L. REV. 91, 109 n. 114 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Fuchs].
12. Britton, 286 Ala. at 498, 242 So. 2d at 666; Derheim, 80 Wash. 2d at 161, 492 P.2d at 1030;
Selgado, 88 N.M. at 579, 544 P.2d at 719.
13. See infra text accompanying notes 41-47.
14. See infra text accompanying notes 26-29. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin found
"a duty, based on the common law standard of ordinary care, to use available seat belts independent
of any statutory mandate." Bentzler v. Braun, 34 Wis. 2d 362, 385, 149 N.W.2d 626, 639 (1967).
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of criminal statutes requiring the use of seat belts would now dispose of
the "statutory duty" rationale.
Some courts have rejected the seat belt defense because some cars are
not equipped with seat belts. 16 Presumably, the defense would place an
impossible burden on occupants of vehicles without seat belts. That burden, however, could be eliminated by limiting the defense to the failure
to use an available seat belt. However, this formulation of the defense
would impose an unequal (although hardly unreasonable) burden on occupants of cars equipped with seat belts.' 7 Whatever the logic of this
rationale, the federal requirement that all automobiles manufactured after
January 1, 1968 be equipped with seat belts' 8 has, by now, rendered it
virtually obsolete.
Other courts have refused to accept the seat belt defense because of
the difficulty in applying rules of causation.' 9 Admittedly, the task of
deciding just which injuries would have been avoided through the use of
the seat belt is not always an easy one. However, this task is not unlike
that confronted by juries in other cases of contributory (or comparative)
negligence. Moreover, as the seat belt defense is an affirmative defense,
the burden of proving the causal relationship between failure to fasten
one's seat belt and subsequent injury should be on the defendant.20 Thus,
the plaintiff is not seriously prejudiced by problems associated with proof
of causation. 2 '
Finally, many courts have rejected the seat belt defense in light of the
fact that most people do not fasten their seat belts.22 Surveys have indicated that upwards of 80% of all automobile passengers do not fasten
their seat belts.23 Many courts have interpreted this widespread conduct
as indicative of the absence of an accepted standard of care with respect
15. Unfortunately, many such statutes expressly prohibit or limit their use to establish a breach
of duty in civil actions. See infra notes 48-60 and accompanying text.
16. Britton, 286 Ala. at 508, 242 So. 2d at 675; Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 124, 570 P.2d at 143.
17. Britton, 286 Ala. at 508, 242 So. 2d at 675.
18. 23 C.F.R. §255.21 (1968) (Standard 208).
19. See, e.g., Barry, 99 N.J. Super. at 270, 239 A.2d at 273.
20. Spier, 35 N.Y. 2d at 450, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920. See also Franklin v.
Gibson, 138 Cal. App. 3d 340, 344, 188 Cal. Rptr. 23, 25 (1982); Mount, 91 111. App. 2d at 1,
234 N.E.2d at 329.
21. The New Mexico Court of Appeals has noted that the added cost to plaintiffs of meeting the
defendants' proof "pales in comparison to the untold billions, not to mention the loss of life and
severity of injuries . . . that could be saved if motorists and their passengers utilized this safety
device." Thomas, 102 N.M. at 426, 696 P.2d at 1019, rev'd 102 N.M. at 326, 695 P.2d at 476.
22. See, e.g., McCord v. Green, 362 A.2d 720, 724-25 (D.C. App. 1976); Kopischke v. First
Continental Corp., 187 Mont. 471, 497, 610 P.2d 668, 682 (1980); Barry, 99 N.J. Super. at 279
n.9, 239 A.2d at 278 n.9; Miller, 273 N.C. at 228, 160 S.E.2d at 73; Amend, 89 Wash. 2d at 124,
570 P.2d at 143.
23. Why Don't We Buckle Up?, So. DIG., Feb. 1985, at 22 (85% nonusage rate); HIGHWAY
UsERs FEDERATION AND AuTOMoTIvE SAFETY FOUNDATION, THtE SAFETY BELT PROPONENT'S GUIDE,

5, (undated) (14% usage rate); Fuchs, supra note 11, at 93 n. 12 (20% usage rate).
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to the use of seat belts. It would appear that these courts have ignored
Holmes' maxim, "What usually is done may be evidence of what ought
to be done, but what ought to be done is fixed by a standard of reasonable
prudence, whether it usually is complied with or not." 24 Simply put,
while conformity with custom may be evidence of non-negligence, it is
not dispositive of the issue, particularly where application of more general
negligence standards (e.g., the utility/risk test of Restatement (Second)
of Torts § 291)25 would suggest that reasonable care was not exercised.
Clearly, the seat belt situation is one in which most of the public does
not conform to a standard of reasonable care. The great weight of evidence
regarding the effectiveness of seat belts in reducing the likelihood of
serious injury bears this out. 26 As the New York Court of Appeals stated
in Spier v. Barker, "When an automobile occupant may readily protect
himself, at least partially, from the consequences of a collision, we think
that the burden of buckling an available seat belt may, under the facts of
the particular case, be found by the jury to be less than the likelihood of
injury when multiplied by its accompanying severity.", 27 The court was
obviously alluding to Judge Learned Hand's famous formula for negligence, as expressed in United States v. Carroll Towing Co. 2' The few
seconds involved in buckling the seat belt, together with the mild discomfort felt by some people in wearing the belt, falls far short of the
product of the probability of an accident and the gravity of the injury that
would be avoided through the fastening of the seat belt.29
24. Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Behymer, 189 U.S. 468, 470 (1903).
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965) provides as follows:

§ 291. Unreasonableness; How Determined; Magnitude of Risk and Utility of
Conduct
Where an act is one which a reasonable man would recognize as involving a risk
of harm to another, the risk is unreasonable and the act is negligent if the risk is
of such magnitude as to outweigh what the law regards as the utility of the act
or of the particular manner in which it is done.
26. See, e.g., National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, Effectiveness and Efficiency of
Safety Belt and Child Restraint Usage Programs;A Technical Report, OFFICE OF PROGRAM AND
DEMONSTRATION EVALUATION, March, 1982, at 10-14 (citing one study indicating possible 40%

reduction in auto deaths through use of lap belts and another study indicating 40-90% reduction in
injury through use of lap and shoulder belts).
27. 35 N.Y.2d at 452, 323 N.E.2d at 168, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 922.
28. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). Under the Hand formula, liability depends upon whether B (the
burden of adequate precautions) is less than P (the probability of injury) multiplied by L (the gravity
of injury).
29. Circumstances will, of course, arise under which application of the Learned Hand formula
will produce a result which does not support the use of seat belts, e.g., the driver backing a few
feet out of the garage before leaving the car to close the garage door, the delivery person whose job
requires frequent exits from the vehicle separated by brief periods of slow-speed travel, etc. The
defense should therefore proceed on a case-by-case basis, at least until such time as all possible
variations have been considered. See Pokora v. Wabash Ry. Co., 292 U.S. 98, 105 (1934). in which
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In light of the above reasoning, the seat belt defense has been recognized in a handful of jurisdictions, even in the absence of statutes mandating their use. Besides New York, 3" the seat belt defense has been
adopted by judicial decisions in Wisconsin, 3 California,32 Illinois,3 3 Indiana,34 Mississippi, 35 Pennsylvania36 and South Carolina.37 The defense
has been described as contributory negligence, an application of the duty
to mitigate damages, the avoidable consequences rule, or simply as a
rule for reduction of recoverable damages.
The failure to fasten one's seat belt might even be characterized as
assumption of risk, in light of the well-known dangers of the highway.
This view is quite plausible. However, if viewed as assumption of risk,
the failure to fasten one's seat belt should be classified as a secondary,
implied, unreasonable (or qualified) assumption of risk.38 Because of the
difficulty in distinguishing this form of assumption of risk from contributory negligence, together with judicial reluctance to impose the complete
defense usually created by assumption of risk, the emerging view is to
treat this form of assumption of risk in the same manner as contributory
negligence in a jurisdiction which has adopted a comparative negligence
scheme. 39 In jurisdictions in which contributory negligence is still a complete bar to recovery, contributory negligence and assumption of risk have
the same practical effect. For this reason (and for reasons indicated earlier)"
the seat belt defense will be treated, for purposes of our discussion, as
an example of contributory (or comparative) negligence.
Justice Cardozo explains "the need for caution in framing standards of behavior that amount to rules
of law."
The utility/risk balancing test of RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291, supra note 25, produces
a result quite similar to that produced by the Learned Hand formula. The risk side may be seen as
the product of the probability of injury and the gravity of injury; except for certain exigent circumstances (as noted earlier in this footnote), neglecting to fasten one's seat belt has virtually no utility
(particularly in relation to the risk side of the balancing test).
30. Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323 N.E.2d at 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
31. Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at 362, 149 N.W.2d at 626.
32. Truman v. Vargas, 275 Cal. App. 2d 976, 80 Cal. Rptr. 373 (1969).
33. Mount, 91 11. App. 2d at 1, 234 N.E.2d at 329. This decision apparently has been overturned
in Clarkson v. Wright, No. 59766, slip op. (111.1985) (an unpublished opinion subject to revision
or withdrawal).
34. Kavanagh v. Butorac, 140 Ind. App. 2d 139, 221 N.E.2d 824 (1966).
35. Glover v. Daniels, 310 F. Supp. 750 (E.D. Miss. 1970).
36. Pritts v. Walter Lowery Trucking Co., 400 F. Supp. 867 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
37. Sams, 247 S.C. at 467, 148 S.E.2d at 154.
38. Secondary (and not primary) because a duty of reasonable care to avoid accidents remains a
responsibility of all drivers; implied (and not express) because the assumption of risk is inferred
through conduct, and unreasonable (or qualified) for reasons already discussed with respect to
contributory negligence. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29.
39. See, e.g., Blackburn v. Dorta, 348 So. 2d 287 (Fla. 1977); see also UNIF. CoMp. FAULT ACT
§ l(b), 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1985).
40. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
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1II. EFFECT OF MANDATORY SEAT BELT USE LEGISLATION

Even in those jurisdictions that have rejected the seat belt defense to
date (and particularly where the rationale has been either the absence of
statutory duty or the custom of nonuse) the enactment of legislation
imposing criminal sanctions for failure to wear a seat belt could add a
new dimension. A statutory requirement that all occupants of the vehicle
wear a seat belt should shift the presumption as to customary usage.
Furthermore, failure to adhere to the statutory standard would be regarded
in many jurisdictions as negligence per se, 4 or as conduct giving rise to
3
a rebuttable presumption,42 or at least a permissible inference, of contributory negligence.
Indeed, at least one authority has suggested that the presumption (or
inference) of negligence raised by a statutory violation relates to the use
of custom in negligence law, because it is customary to obey the law.'
Whether or not that is indeed true, 45 the statutory enactment may have
46
the effect of a legislative declaration regarding the standard of care.
Thus (depending upon the treatment of violation of statute in a given
jurisdiction), the violation of a mandatory seat belt law should, in the
very least, give rise to an inference of contributory negligence, and in
some jurisdictions give rise to a rebuttable presumption of contributory
negligence or "negligence per se.""
Perhaps out of an awareness of their possible impact on tort liability,
most of the recently enacted statutes requiring seat belt use include provisions expressly limiting their application in civil cases. The Illinois
statute provides that "failure to wear a seat safety belt in violation of this
Section shall not be considered evidence of negligence, shall not limit
the liability of an insurer, and shall not diminish any recovery for damages
41. Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y. 164, 126 N.E. 814 (1920). See also Rex Utils., Inc. v. Gaddy,
413 So. 2d 1232 (Fla. App. 1982).
42. Byrne v. City and County of San Francisco, 113 Cal. App. 3d 731, 170 Cal. Rptr. 302
(1980).
43. Allen v. Dhuse, 104 11. App. 3d 806, 60 Ill. Dec. 559, 433 N.E.2d 356 (1982).
44. W. PROSSER & W. P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 231 (5th ed. 1984).
45. Widespread disregard for the 55 m.p.h. speed limit may give one pause. See Peterson, Raising
the Speed Limit in Rural Areas, N.Y. Times, Feb. 6, 1985, at B24.
46. See Martin, 228 N.Y. at 164, 126 N.E. at 814 (Cardozo, J.); cf. Clinkscales v. Carver, 22
Cal. 2d 72, 75-76, 136 P.2d 777, 778 (1943) (Traynor, J.).
47. Where a statutory violation gives rise to a rebuttable presumption of negligence, the burden
shifts to the defendant (or, in the case of contributory negligence, the plaintiff) to rebut the presumption by showing the violation was excused. Zeni v. Anderson, 397 Mich. 117, 243 N.W.2d
270 (1976). There may be very little (if any) difference between this result and the result where the
unexcused statutory violation is negligence per se, as in Martin, 228 N.Y. at 164, 126 N.E. at 814.
Sometimes the excuse can be found within the statute. All of the mandatory seat belt laws enacted
to date exempt certain classes of persons from compliance. Illinois, for example, exempts, inter
alia, delivery people, persons with medical excuses, drivers operating a vehicle in reverse, drivers
of vehicles for which seat belts are not required by law, and rural letter carriers. Act of Jan. 8, 1985,
No. 83-1507, § l(b) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95'/2, § 12-603.1 (1985)).
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arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of a motor vehicle." 48 Statutes subsequently enacted in New Mexico, Indiana, Oklahoma, Texas and Connecticut contain similar provisions.49 The legislatures
of these states not only squandered an opportunity to create a new statutory
standard of care to be applied by the courts in civil actions, but went so
far as to deny the courts the opportunity to find such a standard of care
on their own. 5° In Illinois and Indiana, where the courts had previously
accepted the seat belt defense, 5 the effect of these provisions is particularly telling. As far as acceptance of the seat belt defense in civil actions
is concerned, then, this legislation must be viewed as a step backward.
The Michigan statute provides that its violation may be considered
evidence of negligence, but limits any reduction in damages to five percent.52 The Missouri statute precludes a finding of comparative negligence
due to one's failure to wear a seat belt, but allows evidence of violation
of the mandatory seat belt use law to mitigate damages, subject to a one
percent limitation.53 Nebraska's similarly worded legislation includes a
five percent limitation.54 Louisiana's contains a two percent limitation.55
48. Act of Jan. 8, 1985, No. 83-1507, § 1(c) (codified at ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 95'/2, § 12-603.1
(1985)).
49. Safety Belt Use Act §4B, 1985 N.M. Laws 131 (April 2, 1985) (to be codified at N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§66-7-370--66-7-373); Act of April 17, 1985, No. 1957 §5 (to be codified at IND.
CODE 88 9-8-14-1-9-8-14-6); Act of May 22, 1985, §5, 1985 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 340, 341 (to
be codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, § 12-420); Act of May 16, 1985, § 1(j) 1985 Tex. Sess. Law
Serv. 6062, 6064 (Vernon) (to be codified at TEX. STAT. ANN. art. 6701d, § 107C); Act of May 23,
1985, § 1(c)(4) 1985 Conn. Legis. Serv. 435, 436 (West) (to be codified at CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14100a). These statutes (along with the Illinois statute) are hereinafter collectively referred to as "New
Mexico-type" statutes.
50. It would appear that the seat belt legislation in these states was a product of political compromise between the automobile industry (which wants mandatory seat belt laws enacted in order
to avoid the DOT rule) and the plaintiffs' trial bar (which is willing to tolerate such laws so long
as they do not have the effect of limiting recovery in tort). That this development took place in
Connecticut, a center of the insurance industry, might be explained by the fact that mandatory seat
belt use statutes not calling for mitigation of damages in civil actions fall out of compliance with
the DOT rule, and therefore cannot be used to trigger relaxation of DOT's passive restraint requirement. 49 C.F.R. § 571.208 (1984). The insurance industry has been a traditional supporter of passive
restraints.
51. Mount, 91 111. App. 2d at 1, 234 N.E.2d at 329; Kavanagh, 140 Ind. App. 2d at 139, 221
N.E.2d at 824. The Mount decision has been recently overturned in Clarkson v. Wright, No. 59766,
slip op. (I11.1985). As an unpublished opinion subject to revision or withdrawal, coming after
Illinois' enactment of mandatory seat belt use legislation but dealing with facts arising prior to its
effective date, the Clarkson decision is of little precedential effect.
52. Act of Mar. 8, 1985, No. 85-1, §5, Mich. Legis. Serv. I (West) (to be codified at MicH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 257.710e-257.710F (West)). It is apparently as yet unclear whether the 5%
limitation applies to only those damages attributable to non-use of the seat belt, or to all damages
stemming from the accident. This token mitigation of damages provision may have been inserted
to place this auto industry-dependent state in compliance with the DOT rule.
53. Act of Mar. 5, 1985, L.R. 172-00, § 3, 1985 Mo. Legis. Serv. I (Vernon).
54. Act of Jan. 21, 1985, §7, L.B. 496 (to be codified at NEB. REV. STAT. §39-6, 171 (1985)).
55. Act of July 10, 1985, No. 377, §295.1(E) 1985 La. Sess. Law Serv. 327 (West) (to be
codified at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 32:1(96) and (97) and 295. 1).
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Thus, the legislatures of Michigan, Missouri, Nebraska and Louisiana
substantially diluted the potentially far-reaching effect of their respective
seat belt statutes.
New York's statute retains the seat belt defense as previously set forth
by the courts of that state.56 California's statute states that its violation
"shall not establish negligence as a matter of law or negligence per se
for comparative fault purposes, but negligence may be proven as a fact
without regard to the violation." 57 An early version of New Jersey's seat
belt bill included a provision similar to Illinois' which would have barred
58
consideration of non-use of a seat belt in civil litigation. The legislature
deleted this provision in favor of one which reads, "This act shall not
be deemed to change existing laws, rules, or procedures pertaining to a
trial of a civil action for damages for personal injuries or death sustained
in a motor vehicle accident." 59 Similar language was subsequently enacted
by North Carolina and Hawaii.6 The effect of this language is unclear,
particularly in a state like New Jersey, where the courts appear to have
previously rejected the seat belt defense. 6 The provision would appear
to preclude the courts from finding that the statute created a standard of
care, the breach of which was negligence per se. But what if near-universal
62
compliance with the statute results in a custom of seat belt usage? Can
this custom allow the New Jersey courts to find a new standard of care,
based not on the statute itself, but on community mores which had their
56. The New York statute prohibits evidence of non-compliance on the issue of liability, but
permits its use for purposes of mitigation of damages, without limitation. Act of July 12, 1984, ch.
366, 1984 N.Y. Consol. Advance Laws Serv. 721 (to be codified at N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 1229c.8 (McKinney 1985)). New York thus maintains its position on the seat belt defense as it existed
prior to enactment of the mandatory use legislation. See Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323 N.E.2d at
164, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
57. Act of Oct. 1, 1985, A.B. 27 § 1.5(i) (to be codified at CAL. VEH. CODE, § 12810.2 and
§ 27315).
58. The rejected provision reads as follows:
Failure to wear a safety seat belt system, in violation of this act, shall not be
considered evidence of negligence nor limit liability of an insurer nor diminish
recovery for damages arising out of the ownership, maintenance, or operation of
a passenger automobile. In no event shall failure to wear a safety seat belt system
be considered as contributory negligence, nor shall the failure to wear a safety
belt system be admissible as evidence in the trial of any other civil action.
59. Passenger Automobile Seat Belt Usage Act, ch. 179, §4, 1984 N.J. Sess. Law Serv. 13
(West) (codified at N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 39:3-76.2e-39:3-76.2k (West 1985)).
60. Act of April 19, 1985, § 291 (d) (to be codified at HAWAt REV. STAT. § 291 (d)); Act of May
23, 1985, ch. 222, §20-135.2A(d), 1985 N.C. Sess. Laws 76 (to be codified at N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 20-135.2A(d)).
61. Barry, 99 N.J. Super. at 270, 239 A.2d at 273. The language in Barry is somewhat qualified;
the law of New Jersey on this issue might best be described as unsettled.
62. Early samplings indicate that 70 percent of front-seat occupants in New York wear seat belts
now that New York's mandatory seat belt law is in effect. N. Y. Times, February 28, 1985 at B5.
An April, 1985 Gallup Poll indicates a 40 percent adult seat belt usage rate nationwide up from 17
percent in 1982. N.Y. Times, May 9, 1985, at A13 col. 5.

Spring 1986]

THE SEATBELT DEFENSE RECONSIDERED

origin in the statute? Have the legislatures of New Jersey, North Carolina
and Hawaii, in attempting to treat the situation gingerly, indirectly promoted a standard of care for civil actions? Or would such a result be
construed as antithetical to the enacted provisions, with the resultant
hamstringing of the courts' ability to adapt law to changing community
practices and expectations? As Roland Hedley63 would say, "Only time
will tell."
IV. EFFECT OF SEAT BELT DEFENSE ON DAMAGES
Despite the legislative action described above, the seat belt defense
remains viable in a minority of states,' with the possibility of wider
acceptance as seat belts gain more widespread use. Precisely what bearing
the seat belt defense should have on the plaintiff's right to recover damages remains for consideration. To deny any recovery whatsoever, even
for those injuries which could not have been avoided through the use of
seat belts, would be unduly harsh and represent a windfall to the defendant.65 It would also be at odds with basic rules of causation. The
courts are therefore more likely to adopt one of the following views:
Alternative 1. Some courts have treated the seat belt defense in a manner
similar to the avoidable consequences rule (i.e., denying the plaintiff any
recovery for injuries which would have been prevented through the use
of seat belts).66 This treatment is probably an appropriate one in a jurisdiction which adheres to the rule that contributory negligence bars any
recovery on the part of the plaintiff. The plaintiff should still be entitled
to recover for injuries which could not have been avoided through use
of the seat belt, because failure to fasten the seat belt was not a causein-fact of these injuries.
Alternative 2. In a jurisdiction which has adopted a rule of comparative
negligence, failure to fasten the seat belt should be treated like any
contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff (i.e., it should reduce,
but not entirely eliminate, recovery for those injuries which would have
been avoided through the use of the seat belt). The initial negligence of
the defendant, which triggered the accident, remains a cause-in-fact of
all of the plaintiff's injuries. This is true under both the "but for"67 and
63. Apologies to Doonesburv creator Garry Trudeau.
64. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
65. Comment, The Seat Belt Defense-A Valid Instrument of Public Policy, 44 TENN. L. REV.
119, 124 (1976).
66. E.g., Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323 N.E.2d at 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
67. "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if the event would not have occurred but
for that conduct; conversely, the defendant's conduct is not a cause of the event, if the event would
have occurred without it." W. PROSSER & W.P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS 266 (5th ed. 1984).
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substantial factor68 tests for cause-in-fact. The plaintiff's intervening negligence does not eliminate the defendant's negligence as a proximate
cause of the subsequent injuries.69 Given the current state of affairs, the
* plaintiff's failure to fasten his/her seat belt is certainly foreseeable, and
even if mandatory seat belt laws were to inspire almost universal compliance, the intervening negligence of the plaintiff should interrupt the
product design defect which
causal sequence no less than the intervening
70
crashworthy.
less
automobile
renders an
Operation of this rule of comparative negligence would require the
trier of fact to make two apportionments. First, the trier would have to
determine which of the plaintiff's injuries would have been avoided through
the use of seat belts and which would have been unavoidable in any event.
The aid of accident reconstruction experts would be essential here. The
initial burden of producing these experts would be on the defendant, who
would have the burden of proving not only that the plaintiff was contributorily negligent (i.e., neglected to fasten his/her seat belt), but also
7
that this contributory negligence was the cause-in-fact of certain injuries.
The second apportionment would be similar to those made in other
comparative negligence cases. With respect to only those injuries attributable to failure to use the seat belt, the trier would be required to make
an apportionment of fault between plaintiff and defendant. As in other
comparative negligence cases, a decision would have to be made as to
whether this apportionment should take into account the nature of each
party's conduct, the extent of the causal relation between the conduct
72
and the injuries, or a combination of both. Where the nature of the
parties' conduct is of primary importance, the defendant is likely to be
found more at fault (at least given current attitudes regarding the use of
seat belts), whereas if the causal relationship between conduct and injury
is regarded as paramount, the plaintiff is likely to be found more at fault.
This is of particular importance in those jurisdictions using one of the
68. Id. at 267-68. See also Anderson v. Minneapolis, St. Paul & Sault Ste. Marie Ry. Co., 146
Minn. 430, 179 N.W. 45 (1920).
69. See supra text accompanying notes 7-9.
70. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
71. See supra note 20 and accompanying text.
72. The Uniform Comparative Fault Act takes the position that "[i]n determining the percentage
of fault, the trier of fact shall consider both the nature of the conduct of each party at fault and the
extent of the causal relation between the conduct and the damages claimed." UNIF. COMP. FAULT
AcT § 2(b), 12 U.L.A. 43 (Supp. 1985). For discussions of the relative merits of the "causation"
approach and "negligence" approach to comparative negligence, see Rizzo and Arnold, Causal
Apportionment in the Law of Torts:An Economic Theory, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1399 (1980); Pearson,
Apportionment of Losses Under Comparative Fault Laws-An Analysis of the Alternatives, 40 LA.
L. REV. 343 (1980).
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variations of the fifty percent rule of comparative negligence.73 In these
jurisdictions, a plaintiff found to be more at fault than the defendant is
completely precluded from recovery.74 A plaintiff in this situation should
still be able to recover for all injuries which would not have been avoided
through the use of seat belts.
In a comparative negligence jurisdiction adopting the above view (preferred by the author), a hypothetical case would look like this: Peter
Plaintiff is injured in an accident which began when Dan Defendant (the
driver of an oncoming vehicle) crossed the center line, hitting Peter's car
head-on. Had Peter been wearing a seat belt, he would have suffered
relatively minor cuts and bruises, which, when both special and general
damages were considered, would have entitled him to $5,000. However,
because Plaintiff has neglected to buckle his seat belt, he is thrown from
the vehicle, strikes his head on a tree, and suffers irreversible brain damage
for which he would be entitled to $1 million in damages in the absence
of the seat belt defense. With the seat belt defense in place, Plaintiff
would receive the $5,000 representing the cuts and bruises he would have
suffered in any event.75 The remaining $1 million in damages would be
apportioned in accordance with the jurisdiction's comparative negligence
formula.76
Note that the above resolution, though easily stated, may give rise to
a number of problems. First, there is the practical difficulty of accident
reconstruction. It may not always be an easy task to distinguish between
those injuries which were likely to have been prevented through the use
of a seat belt and those which would have been suffered in any event.
Second, there is the aforementioned problem regarding the considerations
that should be paramount in the comparative negligence formula.7 7 Third,
73. In jurisdictions employing a "fifty percent" rule, a plaintiff is entitled to recover only if his/
her negligence was "not as great as" (e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 13-21-111 (1974)) or "not greater
than" (e.g., 42 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 7102(a) (Purdon 1982)) that of the defendant. The two
formulations produce markedly different results where the jury has apportioned the plaintiff's and
defendant's negligence on a fifty-fifty basis.
74. Cf. Foley v. City of West Allis, 113 Wis.2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983), in which the
Wisconsin Supreme Court stated that a plaintiff's negligent failure to wear an available seat belt
should be used to reduce damages, but not to determine whether the plaintiff's negligence was
greater than that of the defendant and is therefore barred from any recovery.
75. This assumes that the cuts and bruises are still sustained.
76. This would appear to be the view adopted under the Uniform Comparative Fault Act. UNIF.
COMP. FAULT ACT § l(b), 12 U.L.A. 41 (Supp. 1985). See also Wade, Products Liability and
Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform ComparativeFault Act, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373, 385-86 (1978).

77. Of course, this problem is common to all cases of comparative negligence. See Daly v.
General Motors Corp., 20 Cal.3d 725, 747-50, 575 P.2d 1162, 1175-77, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380, 39395 (1978) (Clark, J., concurring). Requiring a trier of fact to place a percentage allocation on relative
fault may well be viewed as subjectivity masquerading as objectivity.
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cases may arise in which some injuries would have been prevented through
the use of seat belts, while others might have occurred because of the
use of seat belts. 78 What of the admittedly rare accident in which the
plaintiff suffers injuries due to his/her failure to use a seat belt, but would
have suffered even greater injuries (perhaps from being crushed inside
the vehicle) had he/she worn a seat belt?79 If we are reducing recovery
where plaintiff's conduct is the cause-in-fact of additional injuries, what
happens to the case in which plaintiff's negligent conduct is, ironically,
the cause-in-fact of reduced injuries? While we cannot allow the plaintiff
to recover for injuries not suffered, the resultant lack of symmetry must
give us pause.
Alternative 3. Yet another alternative would be to allow a comparative
negligence apportionment to be made with respect to all of the plaintiff's
injuries, including those which would not have been avoided through the
use of seat belts. The percentage allocated to "seat belt negligence"
presumably would be smaller in the context of all injuries as opposed to
just those attributable to failure to wear a seat belt, as in Alternative 2.
It would appear that this alternative represents the view taken most frequently by the courts. 8" While this view lacks the precision of the second
alternative, it is easier to explain to the jury and probably produces a
rough approximation of a just result. 8
One of the few courts to consider carefully the role of the seat belt
defense on apportionment of damages is the Supreme Court of Wisconsin.8 2 In Foley v. City of West Allis, 83 that court recognized that any
reduction in damages attributable to a party's non-use of an available seat
78. Under our hypothetical, for example, suppose Peter Plaintiff suffers the permanent brain
damage, but none of the minor scrapes and bruises which would have been suffered had he remained
in the vehicle through use of a seat belt. Should the reduction in Plaintiff's recovery for failure to
use a seat belt be offset by an amount representing those injuries avoided through non-use of a seat
belt?
79. Studies have indicated that "a person is 25 times more likely to be fatally injured if ejected
from the vehicle than if inside and buckled up." See Highway Users Federation, The Safety Bell
Proponent'sGuide (1984) at 6.
80. As most courts recognizing the seat belt defense have yet to carefully consider its effect on
apportionment of damages, the ultimate position of the courts on this issue is still unclear. However,
a few cases at least imply that the plaintiff's negligent failure to fasten his/her seat belt will be
compared to the defendant's negligence in the context of all of the injuries suffered by the plaintiff.
See, e.g., Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 449-50, 323 N.E.2d at 167, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 920; Bentzler, 34 Wis.
2d at 362, 149 N.W.2d at 626.
81. Presumably, a jury instructed to allocate fault in this manner would take into account not
only the relative fault of the parties, but also the causal relationship of the respective fault of each
party to the resulting injuries, thus reaching a result approximating that under Alternative 2. This is
one possible interpretation of the opinion in Foley. See 113 Wis.2d at 4§0-96, 335 N.W.2d at 83134.
82. Wisconsin is viewed as a leader in this area of law. It was one of the first states to enact a
comparative negligence statute. Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1973). It was also among the first to recognize
the seat belt defense. Bentzler, 34 Wis. 2d at 362, 149 N.W.2d at 626.
83. 113 Wis. 2d 475, 335 N.W.2d 824 (1983).
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belt should be applied to only those damages which would have been
averted through the use of the belt mechanism. Taking into account the
fact that the plaintiff may have also been responsible for contributory
negligence which played a role in causing the initial collision (described
by the court as "active negligence" 4 ) the court adopted a procedure
under which the plaintiff's damages were first reduced by the percentage
attributable to his active negligence, 85 and then further reduced by the
percentage of negligence attributable to the plaintiff's failure to wear the
seat belt.86 Some ambiguity remains as to whether this latter reduction
eliminates all recovery for damages which would have been avoided
through seat belt use (as in Alternative I)," or merely reduces recovery
in such a way that the defendant's causal relationship to these damages
is also taken into account (as in Alternative 3).
84. Id. at 484, 335 N.W.2d at 828.
85. Only this "active negligence" would be considered when determining the plaintiff's contributory negligence for purposes of Wisconsin's 50% rule of comparative negligence. Id. at 488-89,
335 N.W.2d at 830-31.
86. The full procedure was set forth as follows:
(I) Determine the causal negligence of each party as to the collision of the two
cars .. .;(2) apply comparative negligence principles to eliminate from liability
a defendant whose negligence causing the collision is less than the contributory
negligence of a plaintiff causing the collision . ..;(3) using the trier of fact's
calculation of the damages, reduce the amount of each plaintiff's damages from
the liable defendant by the percentage of negligence attributed to the plaintiff for
causing the collision . ..;(4) determine whether the plaintiff's failure to use an
available seat belt was negligence and a cause of injury, and if so what percentage
of the total negligence causing the injury was due to the failure to wear the seat
belt . . .: (5) reduce the plaintiff's damages calculated in step (3) by the percentage
of negligence attributed to the plaintiff under step (4) for failure to wear an
available seat belt for causing the injury.
Id. at 490, 35 N.W.2d at 831.
87. See supra text accompanying note 66. This possibility is raised by the court's suggestion that
the Wisconsin Civil Jury Instructions Committee draft an instruction under which "The jury must
determine what percentage of the total damages for that person's personal injuries was caused by
his or her failure to wear a seat belt," id. at 495, 335 N.W.2d at 833. as well as an earlier statement
that "We should seek to treat the plaintiff and defendant in such a way that the plaintiff recovers
damages from the defendant for the injuries that the defendant caused, but that the defendant is not
held liable for incremental injuries the plaintiff could and should have prevented by wearing an
available seat belt." Id. at 489, 335 N.W.2d at 830-831. Under this interpretation, failure to wear
a seat belt would be treated as a superseding cause, an odd result in a state which is considered a
leader in comparative negligence doctrine. At least one author believes that Foley dictates this result.
"The Foley formula categorically holds that injuries caused in part by seat belt negligence will be
attributed solely to seat belt negligence, irrespective of other causes which necessarily contributed
to the result." McChrystal, Seat Belt Negligence: The Ambivalent Wisconsin Rules. 68 MARQ. L.
REV. 539, 547 (1985) [hereinafter cited as McChrystal].
88. See supra text accompanying notes 79-80. This interpretation is suggested by the language
set forth in step 4 of the process described in note 85, and by Wisconsin's general view that
contributory negligence is not a total bar to recovery, due to its comparative negligence statute. The
Foley opinion, however, appears to take the view that "seat belt negligence" should be given different
treatment than that accorded "active negligence" under the statute. 113 Wis. 2d at 488, 335 N.W.2d
at 830. Professor McChrystal has noted the apparent inconsistency of the language in Foley. McChrystal,
supra note 87, at 549-50.
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The lack of judicial clarity regarding the application of the seat belt
defense may be attributable, at least in part, to the nomenclature being
used. Several courts, reluctant to classify failure to use a seat belt as
contributory negligence" or assumption of risk, nevertheless have accepted the defense, either equating it with the avoidable consequences
rule or failure to mitigate damages or creating a new category in which
the defense is allowable as a means of reducing damages. 9° The seat belt
defense is, therefore, often applied outside the usual framework of contributory or comparative negligence. The trend away from traditional
apportionment of damages (as suggested by Alternative 2) and in favor
of percentage allocations applicable to all damages (as suggested by
Alternative 3 and perhaps modern rules regarding comparative fault) may
also play a role in the apparent tendency toward the "jury friendly"
Alternative 3 solution rather than the more mathematically precise apportionment suggested under Alternative 2. The distinction between these
solutions was not lost on Professor Prosser, however, who suggested
"that the doctrines of contributory negligence and avoidable consequences
are in reality the same, and that the distinction which exists is rather one
between damages which are capable of assignment to separate causes,
and damages which are not. '"' Where different damages are attributable
to different causes, then, apportionment (and application of rules of comparative negligence within the apportionment) is at least theoretically
appropriate; the real (and practical) problem is one of proof.
V. THE SEAT BELT DEFENSE IN PRODUCTS LIABILITY ACTIONS

A. Contributory negligence and products liability: a digression
Assuming that the seat belt defense is available to the defendant driver
whose negligence is a cause-in-fact of a motor vehicle accident, should
it also be available to the manufacturer of a vehicle defending a products
liability action? A discussion of the role of contributory negligence in
products liability cases is in order here. 92 In cases involving strict products
liability, the contributory negligence defense has traditionally played a
89. See supra text accompanying notes 4-6. This reluctance may also have been attributable to
the role of contributory negligence as a complete bar to recovery, which should be less of a factor
with the advent of comparative negligence. Kircher, The Safety Belt Defense-Current Status, 16
FOR THE DEFENSE 45, 46 (1975).
90. E.g., Spier, 35 N.Y.2d at 444, 323 N.E.2d at 164, 363 N.Y.S.2d at 916.
91. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS, 424 (4th ed. 1971), quoted verbatim in.W. PROSSER & W. P.
KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 459 (5th ed. 1984).
92. For expanded treatment of this issue, see Schwartz, Strict Liability and Contributory Negligence, 42 TENN. L. REV. 171 (1974); Wade, Products Liability and Plaintiff's Fault-The Uniform
Comparative FaultAct, 29 MERCER L. REV. 373 (1978).
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limited role. Several states (particularly before the introduction of comparative negligence) have followed comment n to Restatement (Second)
of Torts §402A, which states in part:
• . .Contributory negligence of the plaintiff is not a defense when

such negligence consists merely in a failure to discover the defect
in the product, or to guard against the possibility of its existence.
On the other hand the form of contributory negligence which consists
in voluntarily and unreasonably proceeding to encounter a known
danger, and commonly passes under the name of assumption of risk,
is a defense under this Section as in other cases of strict liability. If
the user consumer discovers the defect and is aware of the danger,
and nevertheless proceeds unreasonably to make use of the product
and is injured by it, he is barred from recovery.93

Thus, under the Restatement view, contributory negligence bars the
user or consumer of a defective product from recovery only when his/
her contributory negligence (i.e., unreasonable conduct) combines with
elements of assumption of risk (i.e., voluntary encounter of a known
danger). This overlap of contributory negligence and assumption of risk
concepts is described in some circles as "secondary, implied, qualified
(or unreasonable) assumption of risk."'94 Application of this defense to
failure to fasten an available seat belt should not be too difficult (at least
where adult plaintiffs are involved), in light of the known dangers accompanying failure to wear a seat belt.95
However, some courts have not stopped at the Restatement view in
limiting defenses to products liability actions. Wary of the application of
negligence terms to strict products liability actions, many courts have
rejected the term "contributory negligence" in favor of a defense of
"consumer misuse.

Consumer misuse might be viewed as an appli-

cation of contributory negligence to the specialized field of products
liability, were it not for the tendency of some courts to hold that consumer
misuse is not a defense if the misuse is foreseeable. 97 This development
is probably an unfortunate one. As Professor Richard Epstein has said,
"It may be quite foreseeable that individuals will drive while drunk, not
93. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A comment n (1965).
94. See supra notes 38-39 and accompanying text.
95. The author concedes that this may be considered a question of fact upon which reasonable
persons might differ, particularly given the subjective nature of assumption of risk. See W. PROSSER
& W. P. KEETON, LAW OF TORTS, 487 (5th ed. 1984).
96. Suter v. San Angelo Foundry and Mach. Co., 81 N.J. 150, 406 A.2d 140 (1979).
97. Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 126, 501 P.2d 1153, 1157, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433, 437 (1972); Kennedy v. City of Sawyer, 228 Kan. 439, 618 P.2d 788 (1980); Knitz v. Minster
Mach. Co., 69 Ohio St. 2d 460, 432 N.E.2d 814, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 857 (1982). See also
Wade, supra note 92, at 384.
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use their safety belt, or run red lights. It does not follow that they should
be able to escape the consequences of their own neglect." 98
Opponents of the contributory negligence defense in strict products
liability cases frequently make the "apples and oranges" argument; i.e.,
the negligence of the plaintiff cannot be equated or, in comparative negligence jurisdictions, compared with the strict liability of the defendant.99
The irony of this argument is that it would preclude a defense recognized
in an action where the defendant is negligent from being used in a strict
liability action which requires something less than negligence on the part
of the defendant. If we are dealing with apples and oranges, a negligent
plaintiff's fruit would appear to be far more tainted than that of a defendant
against which no negligence has been proven. As Professor Victor Schwartz
has written, ". . . there seems no reason why a negligent plaintiff should
not be made to bear a loss which is due only in part to the defendant's
defective product or abnormally dangerous activity.""
As a practical matter, we may not be comparing apples and oranges
at all. Particularly in a jurisdiction accepting the benefit/risk test for
product defects'' (and despite the protestations of some courts to the
contrary" 2), the decision as to whether a product is defective is, in the
final analysis, not unlike a negligence determination, in which the utility
of the defendant's conduct is compared with the risk generated thereby. 03
Even in those jurisdictions employing only a consumer expectation test
for product defects, 0 4 the results are unlikely to vary substantially from
a negligence test once constructive knowledge of the product defect has
been imposed on the manufacturer.0 5
Contributory negligence or "consumer misuse" is considered by some
as inappropriate to strict products liability because of the risk-spreading
98. Epstein, Products Liability: The Search for the Middle Ground, 56 N.C.L. REV. 643, 65455 (1978).
99. Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 750-57, 575 P.2d at 1177-81, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 395-99 (Jefferson, J.,
dissenting). Apparently, apples and oranges did not present a stark enough contrast to Justice Jefferson,
who likened a comparison of the plaintiff's negligent conduct and a defendant's defective product
to a comparison between a quart of milk and a metal bar three feet in length. Id. at 751, 575 P.2d
at 1178, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 396.
100. Schwartz, supra note 92, at 177.
101. See, e.g., Barker v. Lull Eng'g Co., Inc., 20 Cal. 3d 413, 573 P.2d 443, 143 Cal. Rptr.
225 (1978).
102. Id. at 418, 573 P.2d at 447, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 229.
103. Wade, On Product "Design Defects" and Their Actionability, 33 VAND. L. REV. 551, 567
(1980).
104. Casrell v. Altec Indus., Inc., 335 So. 2d 128 (Ala. 1976); Seattle-First National Bank v.
Tabert, 86 Wash. 2d 145, 542 P.2d 774 (1975).
105. See Phillips v. Kimwood Machine Co., 269 Or. 581, 525 P.2d 1033 (1974) (likening strict
liability to a test for negligence on the part of a manufacturer with constructive knowledge of the
defect); Wade, On The Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 834-35
(1973).
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objectives of this doctrine."° Strict products liability is viewed as an
example of enterprise liability,' 07 under which a isk-generating enterprise
is held liable for all injuries it causes; the costs of these injuries are
internalized as a cost of the enterprise. Blanket application of this doctrine
to products liability cases, however, frequently ignores the fact that the
user of the product is, like the manufacturer, an active and willing participant in the risk-creating enterprise.' 0 8 Real cost internalization in terms
of both economic efficiency and fairness, therefore, demands that the
user of the product be held accountable to the extent his activity has
created risks, particularly where the manufacturer has taken reasonable
steps to eliminate or reduce these risks (e.g., by installing seat belts in
automobiles). To spread losses by imposing liability on the manufacturer
alone only forces careful consumers (who, for example, buckle their seat
belts) to subsidize the risk-generating conduct of careless consumers (who
don't buckle their seat belts) through the payment of higher prices for
products.
The advent of comparative negligence has led some courts to take a
more hospitable view toward the role of contributory negligence in products liability cases. For example, in Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 0
the Texas Supreme Court recognized a comparative negligence scheme
for products cases,' even though it found strict liability outside the
coverage of Texas' comparative negligence statute.' The court noted the
106. See, e.g., Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 762, 575 P.2d at 1184-85, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 402-03 (Mosk,
J., dissenting); see also Calabresi and Hirschoff, Toward a Test for Strict Liability in Tort, 81 YALE
L.J. 1055, 1078 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Calabresi and Hirschoff]; cf. Schwartz, supra note 92,
at 179.
107. See, e.g., Kinard v. Coats Co., Inc., 37 Colo. App. 555, 557, 553 P.2d 835, 837 (1976).
108. Admittedly, the same argument has been made in the past with respect to the "unholy trinity"
of defenses (contributory negligence, assumption of risk and the fellow servant rule) which existed
in cases involving workplace injuries prior to the advent of workers compensation. However, important factual differences distinguish these situations. Given the almost total absence of employee
bargaining power, only the most formalistic of observers could claim that the nineteenth century
worker assumed the risk of dangers in the workplace. An analogous situation may exist in the
products field, insofar as the consumer is faced with an absence of choice among competing products,
or where the defect is a latent one. See Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161
A.2d 69 (1960); Ford Motor Co. v. Nowak, 638 S.W.2d 582 (Tex. App. 1982). But where (as in
the seat belt defense cases) the user of a product is presented with the option of using a readily
available device which he knows (or reasonably should know) will afford substantial protection from
obvious risks, the analogy to the nineteenth century workplace is inapposite. See Henderson, Coping
with the Time Dimension in Products Liability, 69 CAL. L. REV. 919, 965 (1981).
109. 665 S.W.2d 414 (Tex. 1984). This case includes an excellent summary of the history of the
comparative negligence defense in strict products liability actions.
110. Wary of the "apples and oranges" argument, the Texas court adopted the term "comparative
causation." Id. at 427. Other courts have also tried to avoid negligence terminology. See, e.g., Daly.
20 Cal. 3d at 725, 575 P.2d at 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 380 ("comparative fault"), Suter, 81 N.J.
at 150, 406 A.2d at 140 ("comparative fault").
111. 665 S.W.2d at 426-27.
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paradox created by prior law, which had rejected ordinary comparative
negligence as a defense to strict products liability, but allowed assumption
of risk to act as a total bar to recovery."' Under the new "comparative
causation" scheme, both defenses would henceforth serve to reduce, but
not bar, a plaintiff's recovery. Similarly, the Uniform Comparative Fault
Act includes in its definition of "fault" both strict liability and product
misuse, applying its apportionment rules to both." 3
Thus, the availability of less Draconian means of dealing with plaintiffs'
fault has prompted reconsideration of contributory negligence in products
liability actions. This is a welcome development. As Professor Epstein
has noted, "A party who runs a red light is barred from recovery against
the driver of another automobile. There is nothing special or unique about
the rules of products liability that makes it appropriate for that same driver
to recover for those same injuries against the manufacturer of his own
car. "1"4 Similarly, it would be unreasonable to allow the seat belt defense
to be used by the negligent driver who brought about an accident (e.g.,
by crossing the center line as in our earlier hypothetical), but not by the
automobile manufacturer whose alternative design could have conceivably prevented injury, albeit at greater expense.
B. Application of seat belt defense to products liability actions
In products liability cases in which a product defect is the precipitating
cause of an accident," 5 the seat belt defense should be applied in the
same manner as suggested earlier with respect to the ordinary negligence
case; i.e., the fault of both plaintiff and defendant should be compared,
with the resulting percentages applied to only those injuries which would
have been prevented through the use of the seat belt. However, where
the alleged product defect involves the crashworthiness of the vehicle,
additional questions arise. In the "second collision" case, the plaintiff
alleges not that a product defect precipitated the accident, but that a
properly designed vehicle would have protected him/her from many of
the injuries that ensued." 6 The problems involved in such a case may be
112. 665 S.W.2d at 423-25.
113. § 1(b), 12 U.L.A. 39, 41 (Supp. 1985). To date, no legislature has adopted this uniform
act, but the act has been judicially adopted in Missouri. Gustafson v. Benda, 661 S.W.2d II (Mo.
1983). Under this Act (and in many jurisdictions that have adopted comparative negligence), implied,
secondary, unreasonable assumption of risk is treated in the same manner as contributory negligence.
§ 1(b), 12 U.L.A. at 41. The automobile passenger who, knowing of the hazards of the road,
consciously decides not to use seat belts, probably falls into this category.
114. Epstein, supra note 98, at 655.
115. E.g., Mr. MacPherson's wheel collapses, causing a crash. See MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co., 217 N.Y.382, 111 N.E. 1050 (1916).
116. See cases cited supra note 9.
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demonstrated by adding the following facts to our earlier hypothetical
involving Peter Plaintiff." 7
Assume, in addition to the facts already given, that Plaintiff's injuries
which would have been avoided through the use of a seat belt also could
have been avoided through the auto manufacturer's installation of passive
restraints (i.e., an air bag system)"' in the vehicle. However, let us assume
that while seat belts could be provided at a total cost of $80 and buckled
with the investment of just a few seconds of time by the passenger,
installation of an air bag system would have cost at least $500. In a
products liability action against the manufacturer, we can easily see how
Plaintiff's contributory negligence (in failing to fasten his seat belt) should
sharply reduce the liability of the defendant manufacturer, assuming that
our jurisdiction has a comparative negligence scheme in place.' Somewhat more problematic is the treatment that should be given to Plaintiff's
failure to use an available seat belt in the context of the question whether
the failure to install air bags amounts to a defect at all. Should the auto
manufacturer be at all liable for failure to install the passive restraint
system, at great cost to itself and, ultimately, the consumer, when the
passenger could have provided for his own safety with great ease and at
far less expense? Or, to use a phrase coined by Professor Guido Calabresi,
has not the passenger become the "cheapest cost avoider"? 2 ° Do the
interests of economic efficiency dictate that we place the entire loss on
117. See supra text accompanying notes 75-76.
118. Because the seating arrangements in many vehicles are incompatible with other passive
restraint systems, passive restraint systems usually require the employment of air bags. See Fuchs,
supra note 11, at 102-03.
119. Of course, this reduction (as well as the defendant's liability) would pertain to only those
injuries that could have been avoided through the use of a seat belt or the installation of air bags.
See supra text accompanying note 65.
Note that in a jurisdiction employing a 50% rule for comparative negligence, Plaintiff's failure
to fasten his seat belt should probably deny him all recovery. See supra text accompanying notes
73-74.
120. Professor Calabresi has defined the "cheapest cost avoider" as the party who "is in the best
position to make the cost-benefit analysis between accident costs and accident avoidance costs and
to act on that decision once it is made." Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 106, at 1060 (emphasis
omitted). See also Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven,
Jr., 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 69, 84 (1975); G. CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1970). For a more thorough discussion of Calabresian doctrine in the context
of seat belt legislation, see Fuchs, supra note 11, at 121-39.
Calabresi would probably want us to ask Whether a rule under which the passenger bears losses
attributable to non-use of seat belts presents a realistic choice to the user/consumer. See Calabresi
and Hirschoff, supra note 106, at 1070-76. Because seat belts are generally available in passenger
vehicles, and the ordinary user/consumer is (or should be) aware of the dangers of seat belt nonuse, a realistic choice is available. Granted, most user/consumers may be unaware of the effect of
their choices on tort liability, but what is of central importance here is knowledge concerning the
risk of injury, and the ability to act on that knowledge, not a sophisticated understanding of tort
law.
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the cheapest cost avoider, provided that such person has adequate information to take the steps necessary to avoid injury?
The paucity of cases presenting the above scenario can be attributed,
at least in part, to the adoption by many courts of the "consumer expectation" test for strict products liability set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts §402A, comment i.' 2 ' Because the ordinary automobile
purchaser or passenger does not expect the protection afforded by air
bags, injured passengers are not storming the courts claiming that the
failure to install air bags amounts to a design defect. However, a portent
of things to come may have been suggested by Turner v. GeneralMotors
Corp.,z122 in which the injured driver of a Chevrolet which had overturned
in an accident avoidance maneuver claimed that his automobile was defective due to the absence of a roll bar. The court found comment i to
be applicable to crashworthiness and reversed a defendant's judgment,
stating that "the average consumer. . . may well expect the roof of [his]
car to maintain its structural integrity in a roll-over accident."2 Installation of roll bars, like air bags, is likely to involve far greater expense
than the fastening of seat belts. Should a passenger be allowed any
recovery due to the absence of a roll bar if the injuries which could have
been prevented by this device also could have been prevented by his
merely buckling his seat belt? Should consumer expectations alone control
when the consumer is (or should be) aware of a readily available device
to protect himself?' 24
Application of a benefit/risk test for failure to install air bags (or roll
bars) as called for under ordinary negligence rules' 25 or as an alternate
test for design defect under Barker v. Lull Engineering2 ' might well result
121. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §402A comment i (1965) provides in pertinent part as
follows:
The rule stated in this Section applies only where the defective condition of
the product makes it unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer. . . . The
article sold must be dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the community as to its characteristics.
122. 514 S.W.2d 497 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974), rev'd 584 S.W.2d 844 (Tex. 1979).
123. Id. at 505.
124. The consumer expectation test, combined with the view that consumer misuse is not a
defense when it is foreseeable, becomes both over and underinclusive: overinclusive because it
allows recovery by a consumer who fails to take reasonable steps to protect him or herself; underinclusive because it fails to protect the innocent bystander victim of unreasonably dangerous products
which perform in a manner consistent with consumer expectations (e.g., the handgun victim).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 291 (1965), set forth supra note 25.
126. See Barker, 20 Cal. 3d at 435, 573 P.2d at 456-58, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 239-40. The benefit/
risk test is preferred by the author, because it better embodies tort principles (as distinguished from
the contract/warranty principles suggested by the consumer expectation test) and therefore affords
better protection to third parties who, while foreseeable victims of defective products, are strangers
to the transaction between manufacturer and consumer. Fusion of the benefit/risk test with the defenses
of contributory negligence and assumption of risk protects these third parties without being overprotective of consumers who engage in foreseeable misuse of the product.
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in a primafacie case for negligence or defective design. While Barker's
benefit/risk test involves a comparison between the design used and alternative designs in terms of mechanical feasibility, cost and adverse
consequences to the product,' 27 it does not call for a comparison between
the burden to the defendant of an alternative design and the burden to
the plaintiff of taking measures for his own safety. Employing a Barkertype test, a jury might conclude that an automobile lacking air bags is
defective, even with respect to injuries which could have been avoided
through the use of seat belts. A more satisfactory test would consider, in
addition to the factors suggested in Barker, whether the product already
had design features which could eliminate or substantially reduce the risks
involved, if properly employed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's burden in
employing these features would also be a factor. In the case of seat belts,
that burden ordinarily would be quite light. To use terminology suggested
by Learned Hand, the test would ask not only whether, from the manufacturer's view, the burden of remedial measures is less than the product
of the probability of injury and the gravity of injury, 28 but also whether
the manufacturer's burden was greater or less than that of the user or
consumer. Such a Calabresian test (i.e., who is the cheapest cost avoider?)'29
is more likely to produce an economically efficient result.
A case that appears to endorse the above theory is Daly v. General
Motors Corp. 30 In Daly, the plaintiffs' decedent's Opel, while traveling
at high speed, collided with a metal divider fence. After the initial impact
with the fence, the driver's door was thrown open and Daly was forcibly
ejected from the car, sustaining fatal head injuries. It was undisputed that
had Daly remained in the Opel his injuries probably would have been
relatively minor.' 3 ' Daly's survivors claimed that his Opel was defective
due to an exposed pushbutton on the door latch which, they claimed,
enabled the door to pop open upon impact with the metal divider. Regarding Daly's own conduct, evidence indicated that he was intoxicated,
that he may have been traveling at an excessive speed, that he lost control
of the vehicle, that he had failed to fasten the seat belt and shoulder
127. Id. at 431, 573 P.2d at 455, 143 Cal. Rptr. at 237.
128. Here, the burden of remedial measures is synonymous with the disutility of an alternative
design. Again, no apologies for roughly equating Barker's benefit/risk test with the utility/risk test
employed in negligence cases.
129. See supra note 120. See also Calabresi and Hirschoff, supra note 106, in which the authors
suggest that "the correct optimizing rule, under the Learned Hand test, would be to have a doctrine
of contributory negligence, but to apply it only where the cost of injurer avoidance exceeds the cost
of victim avoidance." Id. at 1058.
Calabresi would probably resist a comparative fault allocation of damages between manufacturer
and user because (1) it would dilute economic incentives to avoid accidents and (2) it would involve
large transaction (or what Calabresi calls "tertiary") costs due to the case-by-case determinations
that such a rule would likely require.
130. 20 Cal. 3d 725, 575 P.2d 1162, 144 Cal. Rptr. 380 (1978).
131. Id. at 730, 575 P.2d at 1164, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 382.
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harness with which the car had been equipped, and that he had failed to
utilize the inside door lock. 132 The defendant contended that if either the
seat belt-shoulder harness system or the door lock had been used, Daly
ejected from the vehicle, and serious injury would
would not have been
33
not have resulted.1
The Daly case is known primarily for California's extension of comparative fault to strict liability cases. Under the court's holding, a jury
would be allowed to apportion liability between Daly and the defendant
manufacturer, taking into account both the defective design of the product
and the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. 'Almost lost in the shuffle
was the court's statement that in considering whether the vehicle was
defective in the first place, the jury should consider not only the dangers
inherent in the door latch but also the safety features already provided,
such as the seat belts and the inside door locks.' 35 Thus, the opinion
indicates that seat belt availability and use are relevant not only as a
defense capable of reducing liability under a comparative fault scheme,
but also with respect to the threshold issue of whether any design defect
exists. 13
To incorporate this reasoning into Barker's benefit/risk test, the author
would suggest the following procedure: The trier should first compare
the burden to the defendant of employing an alternative, less risky design'37
with the burden to the plaintiff of using available safety devices (e.g.,
seat belts and door locks).' 3 8 If the defendant's burden is found to be
greater, the trier should then apply a benefit (or utility)/risk test to the
132. Id. at 731, 575 P.2d at 1165, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 742, 575 P.2d at 1172, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 390.
135. Id. at 746-47, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93. The California Supreme Court
nevertheless reversed the defense verdict in Daly because in the absence of a limiting instruction,
evidence of Daly's intoxication and failure to use available safety devices may have been improperly
regarded by the jury as authorizing a verdict barring all recovery. Id. at 745-46, 575 P.2d at 1174,
144 Cal. Rptr. at 392.
136. Id. This view had been taken earlier by Professor Wade, who had included among the factors
to be used in determining the existence of a design defect "[tihe safety aspects of the product-the
likelihood that it will cause injury, and the probable seriousness of the injury," and "[t]he user's
ability to avoid danger by the exercise of care in the use of the product." Wade, On the Nature of
Strict Tort Liabilityfor Products, 44 Miss. L. J. 825, 837 (1973). See also McElroy v. Allstate Ins.
Co., 420 So. 2d 214, 217 (La. App. 1982) (evidence of existence of seat belt was properly before
the jury on the issue of whether a defect existed).
137. This burden would incorporate both cost and inconvenience, and would in effect measure
the benefit (or utility) of the design used over the alternative design. It should represent the increased
costs and inconvenience of the alternative design, just as the ight-hand side of the Learned Hand
formula should measure the marginal reduction in risk obtained through the alternative design.
138. We have already determined, with respect to seat belts, that the burden of availing oneself
of these devices is ordinarily far less than the risks posed by their non-use. See supra text accompanying notes 26-29. That the same can be said of door locks there is little doubt. Were the burden
of using these safety devices to outweigh the risks prevented, this procedure would not be used,
and the next step, a discounting of the risk for available safety devices, would be inappropriate.
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defendant's design choice. However, the risk should be discounted in
light of the first finding, i.e., that there are safety measures available to
the plaintiff at relatively little cost. 139
Applying these rules to the facts in Daly, the trier may find an alternative
design (e.g., a hinge-type, recessed door latch) no more costly (in terms
of both dollars and convenience) than a push-button door latch.14° The
manufacturer's burden would therefore be too light to offset even the
minuscule burden to the plaintiff of fastening the seat belt and locking
the door. A design defect would therefore be found; the trier would still
proceed to the issue of comparative negligence for what, in this case,
would probably result in a substantial reduction in damages.
In our air bag hypothetical,141 however, a different result would obtain.
Because the manufacturer's burden of installing air bags is well in excess
of Plaintiff's burden of fastening his seat belt, the risks imposed by a
vehicle without air bags should be discounted in light of the means readily
available to Plaintiff to avoid these risks. We should, of course, take care
to discount only those risks which would be eliminated through the use
of seat belts. To the extent air bags eliminate risks not eliminated by seat
belts, or even further reduce risks only partially reduced by seat belts,
the discount should not apply. 4'2
139. This procedure is represented mathematically as follows:
1. Determine whether Bd > Bp, where Bd represents defendant's burden of
employing an alternative, less risky design and Bp represents plaintiff's burden
of using available safety devices;
2. If Bd > Bp, determine whether Bd < (PI x L) - (P2 x L2 ), where (P
x Ll) represents the risk after plaintiff has availed him/herself of available
safety devices and (P2 x L2) represents the risk that remains after defendant
has employed the alternative design. The difference between these two products
represents the marginal reduction of risk represented by the alternative design.
The above formulation recognizes that only in the rarest of instances is a risk eliminated entirely.
140. The transaction costs of redesigning and retooling play no role here; assuming that the
technology was available at the time of the original design, we can simply second-guess the design
choice made at that time. See Boatland of Houston v. Bailey, 609 S.W.2d 743, 746 (Tex. 1980).
141. See supra text accompanying notes 118-19.
142. These remaining risks may well be sufficient to justify the installation of air bags, and to
render a car not so equipped to be defective under a benefit/risk test, if not a consumer expectation
test. If this proves to be true (and the author strongly suspects it is), a cause-in-fact problem arises
in a case in which air bags would have provided protection equal to, but not greater than, use of
available seat belts. Should the vehicle be considered defective due to the increased protection
generally afforded by air bags, or should it be considered non-defective because it would have
provided no greater protection under the facts of this particular case? A traditional view of causein-fact would suggest the latter result; public policy considerations might, however, suggest a finding
of defectiveness. Compare Conti v. Ford Motor Co., 743 F.2d 195 (3d Cir. 1984) (requiring affirmative proof of causation in a failure-to-warn case) with Frankel v. Lull Engineering Co., 334 F.
Supp. 913, 925-26 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (relaxing causation requirement).
Notwithstanding whether a car lacking air bags is defective, one cannot help but wonder why no
domestic auto manufacturer offers these devices as an option available at additional cost. The author,
for one, would be willing to forego extra chrome, whitewalls, pinstriping and other generally available
options for the extra margin of safety provided by air bags.
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One might question the fairness of allowing the plaintiff's failure to
fasten his seat belt to be used not only to reduce damages under a comparative negligence scheme, but also to initially determine whether a
defect exists. But as Professor Wade has noted, "one must draw a distinction between the situation in which there is no breach of duty by the
defendant (i.e., the product is not dangerously defective and therefore
not actionable) and the situation in which the defendant has breached his
duty but plaintiff is also at fault."' 43 This concept may be demonstrated
by using an analogous negligence case: Suppose the driver of an automobile uses reasonable care. She drives at a reasonable speed, looks out
for other vehicles and pedestrians, and is not otherwise distracted. Suddenly, a pedestrian darts in front of the vehicle, and is struck and injured,
due to no fault of the driver. We might say that the pedestrian was
contributorily negligent, but the issue of contributory or comparative
negligence is never reached, because the driver is not negligent in the
first place. In like manner, strict liability first requires the finding of a
defect. It does no damage to the principle of comparative negligence to
preclude the weighing of relative fault when a defect has not been found
in the first instance. Nor need we limit our inquiry to only one isolated
aspect of a product's design; other aspects of the design may render an
otherwise defective product non-defective. "
It is one thing to protect the unknowing plaintiff from a latent defect
about which the manufacturer has knowledge or, through imposition of
constructive knowledge,1 45 is assumed to have knowledge. 146 It is quite
another thing to protect the plaintiff from a "defect" about which both
plaintiff and manufacturer are equally aware, and which can be remedied
by the plaintiff at far less cost and with little inconvenience. A denial of
recovery in the latter case (or at least a severe reduction under comparative
fault principles) not only makes economic sense,' 47 but is also consistent
with a social policy based on individual accountability.
143. Wade, supra note 92 at 384. Professor Wade's statement is directed primarily toward the
unforeseeable misuse of an otherwise non-defective product. I would also apply it to the plaintiff's
foreseeable, but unreasonable misuse where the defendant's burden of preventing such misuse is
greater than the plaintiff's burden of foregoing such misuse.
144. "Product designs do not evolve in a vacuum, but must reflect the realities of the market
place, kitchen, highway, and shop. Similarly, a product's components are not developed in isolation,
but as part of an integrated and interrelated whole." Daly, 20 Cal. 3d at 746, 575 P.2d at 1175, 144
Cal. Rptr. at 393.
145. See, e.g., Phillips, 525 P.2d at 1036, citing Keeton, Manufacturer's Liability: The Meaning
of "Defect" in the Manufacture and Design of Products, 20 SYRACUSE L. REV. 559, 568 (1969).
146. See e.g., Nowak, 638 S.W.2d at 582; Lenhardt v. Ford Motor Co., 102 Wash. 2d 208, 683
P.2d 1097 (1984). Both of these "park to reverse" cases involved a latent design defect in a vehicle's
gear shift mechanism.
147. One author applying a Calabresian analysis has suggested that a rule mandating the installation of air bags:
requires the twenty percent of the population currently using seat belts to incur
a substantial expense to obtain a level of protection no better than and possibly
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VI. A NOTE ON INDIVIDUAL ACCOUNTABILITY

One may question why an article which places such importance on
notions of individual accountability has as its point of departure the
enactment of statutes imposing criminal sanctions for failure to protect
oneself.'4 8 Indeed, in a perfect world, we might wish to rely upon the
general deterrence of a rule denying recovery in tort rather than the specific
deterrence of a criminal sanction for non-use of seat belts. 49
' However,
the enactment of mandatory seat belt laws, while eliminating the element
of choice (assuming that one has no choice but to obey the law), does
not eliminate considerations of individual responsibility. Ironically, while
criminal sanctions for non-use of seat belts may well prove unenforceable, 50 mandatory seat belt laws, if appropriately framed, could have
their greatest impact by setting a standard of care that is carried over into
the field of torts. The major failure of the New Mexico-type statutes is
that they provide for criminal sanctions, but expressly preclude the use
of evidence of failure to use a seat belt in civil actions. 15' The Missouri,
inferior to the one they are currently enjoying. This is because the air bag
mandate externalizes the costs of accident reduction on the entire car-buying
population rather than on non-car-owning occupants who may in fact be the
best [cost] avoiders.
Fuchs, supra note 11, at 135.
148. Mandatory seat belt bills have been criticized in some legislatures as being too restrictive
of individual liberty and posing a risk of excessive government meddling (a criticism also directed
at laws requiring the use of motorcycle helmets). Maryland House PanelKills Mandatory Seat Belt
Bill: Distrust of Government Interference Cited, Wash. Post, March 8, 1985, at B7; Virginia Committee Kills Mandatory Seat Belt Bill, Wash. Post, Feb. 16, 1985, at B I. The author is more inclined
to agree with columnist Russell Baker, who has written:
.. . [T]his nonsensical attempt to identify Madison, Jefferson and Hamilton
with the urge to endanger one's life needlessly during the operation of machinery
has caught on among politicians since the issue of mandatory seat-belt laws
has appeared in the legislatures ...
• . . The same argument, of course, can be made against requiring drivers to
apply brakes when encountering a red light at a busy intersection. If you are
willing to risk being broadsided by a highballing 18-wheeler while expressing
your resistance to government meddling at intersections, isn't that your Madison-Jefferson-Hamilton-given constitutional right?
It is an absurd argument . . . but when you debate with fools by taking their
arguments at face value, absurdity is inescapable.
N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1985 at 21.
The ultimate absurdity is reached when one argues that it is one's constitutional right to refuse
to fasten one's seat belt, but that others should be forced to pay for the consequences.
149. For an argument in favor of a rule of specific deterrence in the form of mandatory seat belt
use laws, see Fuchs, supra note 11, at 136-39.
150. There are obvious problems in detection here, particularly with respect to rear seat lap belts.
By the time the state trooper who suspects non-use saunters up to the offending vehicle, the occupants
may have been able to fasten previously unused seat belts (if they can find them). Taking things a
step further, Oklahoma's mandatory seat belt use law prohibits routine stops of motorists for purposes
of enforcement. Act of May 22, 1985, § 2D 1985 Okla. Sess. Law Serv. 340 (West) (to be codified
at OKLA. STAT. tit. 47, §§ 12-416-12-420).
151. See supra notes 48-51 and accompanying text.
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Michigan, Nebraska and Louisiana statutes, which limit any reduction in
damages to 1%, 5%, 5% and 2% respectively, 5 2 are not much better in
this respect. Thus, individual liberty and autonomy are arguably restrained, while courts are barred from holding individuals fully accountable for their conduct when they seek compensation for injuries which
they themselves have caused in part. But for the possible protection that
mandatory seat belt laws afford to third parties,' 53 the New Mexico-type
statutes (and to a lesser extent, their Michigan-type counterparts) may be
regarded as representing the worst of both worlds.
For those who view the tort law only as a means of effecting compensation to accident victims, the seat belt defense may appear unpalatable. This is particularly true in products liability actions, where judgments
against defendant manufacturers are likely to result in wider distribution
of risks through the pricing mechanism. However, to the extent that
compensation (without respect to fault or cause) is our goal, it may be
more rationally and fairly achieved through either a system of compulsory
first-party insurance"' or a state-run social insurance program.' 55 It is
inefficient as well as unfair to lay all responsibility at the feet of a manufacturer whose role in the elimination of risk is relatively minor, and
who is likely to distribute the risk through a pricing mechanism which
penalizes the careful and careless user/consumer in equal fashion.
VII. CONCLUSION
As we have seen, the seat belt defense is a logical application of the
generalized standard of care in negligence cases. The enactment of statutes
imposing criminal penalties for failure to fasten an automobile seat belt
would normally present an excellent opportunity for courts to impose a
duty to use this safety mechanism. However, by enacting statutory provisions precluding or limiting the admission of evidence of non-use in
civil actions, legislatures squander this opportunity.
The seat belt defense is, at its essence, one of contributory negligence
152. See supra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
153. The dangers and costs imposed on others by one's failure to use a seat belt may nevertheless
justify specific deterrence in this area. See Letter of Illinois Governor James R. Thompson to Illinois
General Assembly, Jan. 8, 1985 (suggesting that non-use of seat belts might cause drivers to lose
control of their vehicles during emergency situations). In support of Illinois' mandatory seat belt
use law, Gov. Thompson also cited the increased societal costs of caring for those who have failed
to fasten their seat belts. Id. An extreme libertarian would, of course, respond that society should
not be responsible for such costs.
The potential harm to others through a driver's non-use of a seat belt distinguishes this device
from the motorcycle helmet (also a subject of controversial compulsory use laws). Concern over
societal costs related to injured non-users exists with respect to both devices.
154. Epstein, supra note 98, at 660.
155. See HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 96 (1881); Accident Compensation Act of 1972, 2 Stat.
N.Z. 1409 (1975).
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and, therefore, should be treated in the same manner as contributory
negligence under a comparative negligence or comparative fault scheme.
This defense should be available in products liability actions to promote
both economic efficiency and individual accountability. Until such time
as a policy choice is made to move to a general system of compensation
for all injuries, regardless of cause, the tort system should be designed
to hold all parties accountable for their conduct. The seat belt defense is
consistent with this premise.

